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The empirical approach to research in property 
law 
Lisa Whitehouse and Susan Bright* 
This article offers an account of the unique characteristics, challenges and 
benefits of empirical legal research. The authors explain that empirical legal 
research involves the collection and observation of data through a variety of 
research techniques, such as interviews, observation and surveys, and how 
it difers from some of its close neighbours, in particular socio-legal 
research. While the challenges posed by empirical legal research are 
acknowledged, this article argues that it enriches property law scholarship 
by enabling researchers to weave together the law learned in books with the 
law understood and applied in practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
Empirical legal research has much to offer to those undertaking research into the fascinating topic of 
property law.1 First and foremost, it has the potential to generate unique insights into law. It is only 
through empirical work, for example, that we know how housing possession cases operate in practice,2 
how occupiers deal with justiciable housing problems,3 whether green clauses are used in commercial 
leases,4 and how individuals conceive of “home”.5 In addition to the excitement engendered by gathering 
data to discover something new about law, burgeoning researchers (particularly at the doctoral research 
stage), can take advantage of the fact that the relative lack of empirical legal research “creates far greater 
opportunities for making an original contribution to legal scholarship”.6 
Cane and Kritzer observe that there has been a “lively interest in empirical legal research”7 over the 
last 20 years, particularly in the United States. Yet, despite the clear benefits that empirical work offers 
to legal scholarship, there are serious doubts as to whether this “lively interest” can be sustained. The 
2006 Nuffield Foundation report on Law in the Real World stated that empirical legal researchers are 
rare in the United Kingdom, particularly within the field of civil justice, and on the verge of becoming 
an endangered species.8 It is incumbent upon established empirical legal scholars, 
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1 For the history of empirical legal research see Genn H, Partington M and Wheeler S, Law in the Real World: Improving Our 
Understanding of How Law Works. Final Report and Recommendations of the Nuffıeld Inquiry on Empirical Legal Research 
(Nuffield Foundation, London, November 2006) Ch 2. On empirical studies of property law, see Cowan D, “Housing and 
Property” in Cane P and Kritzer HM (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010), pp 331-352. 
2 For example, Hunter C, Blandy S, Cowan D, Nixon J, Hitchings E, Pantazis C and Parr S, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion 
in Rent Arrears Cases, Research Series 6/05 (Department for Constitutional Affairs, London, October 2005); Ford J, Kempson E 
and Wilson M, Mortgage Arrears and Possessions; Perspectives from Borrowers, Lenders and the Courts (HMSO, London, 
1995); and Whitehouse L, “A Longitudinal Analysis of the Mortgage Repossession Process 1995-2010: Stability, Regulation 
and Reform” in Bright S (ed), Modern Studies in Property Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) pp 151-174. 
3 Genn H, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About Going to Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999). 
4 Bright SJ and Dixie H, “Evidence of Green Leases in England and Wales” (2013) 6 International Journal of Law in the Built 
Environment 6. 
5 Gurney CM, “Pride and Prejudice: Discourses of Normalisation in Public and Private Accounts of Home Ownership” (1999) 
14 Housing Studies 163 and Gurney CM, “Lowering the Drawbridge: A Case Study of Analogy and Metaphor in the Social 
Construction of Home-Ownership” (1999) 36 Urban Studies 1705. 
6 Heise M, “The Importance of Being Empirical” (1998-99) 26 Pepperdine Law Review 807 at 821-822. 
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therefore, to mentor less experienced colleagues in the ways of empirical legal research.9 As a small 
contribution to that effort, this article explains the unique characteristics of the empirical approach to 
research in property law and promotes its benefits in the hope of encouraging nascent researchers to 
carry the torch of empirical legal research. 
Empirical legal research also poses unique challenges. It is not a feature common to 
undergraduate law degree programs.10 Lack of training, the need to obtain funding, and the very 
long design and planning stages all have the potential to deter researchers. In this article the authors 
explain what empirical legal research is, the value it adds, how it differs from other approaches to 
research within property law, and the methods typically employed in empirical legal research. 
While acknowledging the challenges that empirical legal research poses to researchers, discussed in 
the penultimate section, the authors argue that property law scholarship is much richer for empirical 
work that enables us to weave together the law learned in books with the law understood and 
applied in practice. 
THE MEANING AND VALUE OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
While there is no universally accepted definition of “empirical legal research”, there is a degree of 
consensus within the relevant literature in respect of its essential characteristics. These include the use 
of observable and verifiable data – whether quantitative (numerical) or qualitative (non-numerical) – in 
order to generate knowledge about law. Focusing upon the data obtained, Kritzer, for example, claims 
that the distinctive feature of empirical legal research is “the use of systematically collected data, either 
qualitative or quantitative, to describe or otherwise analyze some legal phenomenon”.11 Burton focuses 
instead on the methods by which such data may be obtained, describing it as “the study of law, legal 
processes and legal phenomena using social research methods, such as interviews, observations or 
questionnaires”.12 
While the systematic collection of data through the application of certain research methods 
constitutes a fundamental characteristic of empirical legal research, focusing on these aspects alone can 
lead to the view that empirical legal research is “a method of research rather than an end in itself”.13 
Empirical legal research, however, serves one ultimate and unified end which is to generate knowledge 
about law by offering a representative account of how it operates in practice. As the Nuffield report 
suggests, “empirical research helps us to understand the law better and an empirical understanding of 
the law in action helps us to understand society better”.14 The authors would argue, therefore, that 
empirical legal research is best defined as the use of observable and verifiable primary data (whether 
quantitative or qualitative) in order to generate knowledge about law by offering a representative 
account of how it operates in practice. That account may be purely descriptive, shining a light on a 
hitherto unknown area of legal implementation. Alternatively, the researcher may wish to use the data 
obtained to test a particular hypothesis, to support a particular theory or to offer a contextual account of 
the law. What is significant, however, is that empirical legal research “provides information of a 
different character from that which can be obtained through other methods of 
9 Empirical legal scholars have noted the influence that a, sometimes chance, relationship with an established scholar had on their 
decision to conduct empirical legal research, see Genn, Partington and Wheeler, n 1 at [74]. See also Hillyard P, “Law’s 
Empire: Socio-Legal Empirical Research in the Twenty-first Century” (2007) 34.2 Journal of Law and Society 266 at 268. 10Calls 
for the integration in undergraduate degree programs of training in social science methodologies and empirical legal 
research have been made by, among others, Cowan, n 1 and Hunter C, “Introduction: Themes, Challenges and Overcoming 
Barriers” in Hunter C (ed), Integrating Socio-Legal Studies into the Law Curriculum (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012) 
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12 Burton M, “Doing Empirical Research: Exploring the Decision-Making of Magistrates and Juries” in Watkins D and 
Burton M (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, Abingdon, 2013) p 55. 
13 Galligan DJ, “Legal Theory and Empirical Research” in Cane and Kritzer (eds), n 1, p 979. 
14 Genn, Partington and Wheeler, n 1 at [4]. 
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research. It answers questions about law that cannot be answered in any other way”.15 In support of this 
claim, the following section of this article distinguishes empirical legal research from other approaches 
common in the field of property law. 
Black letter v empirical approaches 
McCrudden distinguishes between two approaches to science which have been applied to the study of 
law. The first, “older”, approach involves the application of “logic, reason and argument to a body of 
material considered legal”.16 The second concerns “the generation of knowledge by empirical 
investigation”.17 The first of these approaches perhaps best describes the traditional method of 
researching law, particularly prevalent within property law, known as the “black letter” or “doctrinal” 
approach. This involves the close analysis of primary legal sources so as to offer a reasoned and 
coherent account of law that is directed at those internal to the legal system.18 Put more simply, it offers 
an account of “law in books” rather than “law in action”.19 
Applying a simple definition of empirical legal research, such as “the systematic collection of 
information (‘data’) and its analysis according to some generally accepted method”,20 it becomes 
apparent that certain forms of the doctrinal approach could be described as empirical. The tradition in 
the United States of coding judicial opinions, for example, offers substantial quantitative data in the 
form of thousands of judgments. Traditional legal textbooks may also be described as empirical given 
that they tend to draw on primary data in the form of case law and statute. While the authors accept that 
the use and ordering of doctrinal material may be considered empirical, the focus it gives to material 
internal to lawyers means that it does not fall within the authors’ conception of empirical legal research. 
For this reason it is argued that the doctrinal approach is more appropriately described as “legal 
analysis”,21 and that the term “empirical legal research” should be reserved for a different kind of 
empirical approach to the study of property law. 
The authors’ preferred conception of empirical legal research is more akin to McCrudden’s second 
scientific approach which offers a more “external” view of law.22 Within this approach, law is not seen 
as a separate, self-contained field of study, but as a social institution, capable of influencing and being 
influenced by other social phenomena. McCrudden identifies three schools of thought that have arisen 
out of this social scientific approach: socio-legal studies, critical legal studies, and law and economics. 
It is the first of these that concerns us here for the reason that socio-legal research is related closely 
and, at times, seen as equivalent to empirical legal research. 
Socio-legal research v empirical legal research 
The similarity between socio-legal research and empirical legal research is made apparent when one 
considers the various definitions offered in respect of the former. Although a precise definition remains 
“contentious”,23 the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) (ESRC) describes socio-legal 
research as being concerned with “the social, political and economic influences on and impact of the 
law and the legal system”.24 For many, the unique feature of this approach lies in the reciprocal 
15 Bradney A, “The Place of Empirical Legal Research in the Law School Curriculum” in Cane and Kritzer (eds), n 1, p 1033. 
16 McCrudden C, “Legal Research and the Social Sciences” (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 632 at 635. 
17 McCrudden, n 16 at 637. 
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10.4 Law & Society Review 547 at 550 and Hutchinson T, “Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury” in Watkins and Burton 
(eds), n 12, p 9. 
19 Pound R, “Law in Books and Law in Action” (1910) 44 American Law Review 12. 
20 Cane and Kritzer, n 7, p 4. 
21 Cane and Kritzer, n 7, p 5. 
22 McCrudden, n 16 at 637. 
23 Cownie F and Bradney A, “Socio-legal Studies: A Challenge to the Doctrinal Approach” in Watkins and Burton (eds), n 12, p 
35. 
24 Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), Joint AHRC ESRC Statement on Subject Coverage: Interfaces between the 
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relationship between law, sociology, political science, economics and anthropology. As the Socio-Legal 
Studies Association’s strap-line demonstrates, socio-legal research is “where law meets the social 
sciences and humanities”.25 
Comparing these conceptions of socio-legal research with the definition of empirical legal 
research adopted here,26 it becomes apparent why so many scholars view the two approaches as 
intimately linked and, on occasion, use the two terms interchangeably.27 Hunter, for example, 
describes the relationship between socio-legal and empirical legal research as largely a one-way 
process. The former does not necessarily encompass the latter but empirical legal research does 
require a socio-legal approach: “in order to understand what can be gained from an empirical study, 
students must be able to situate this in the broader theoretical frames of socio-legal studies”.28 
Empirical legal research and socio-legal research are natural bedfellows but care must be taken to 
distinguish the two. The Nuffield Inquiry emphasised that the lack of empirical legal research 
capacity did not equate to a lack of socio-legal studies, “what is missing is not text-based studies that 
allude to law’s social context, but studies of how legal processes, outcomes or structures actually are 
in the ‘real world’”.29 Socio-legal research does not necessarily involve empirical legal research,30 as 
demonstrated by a perusal of key socio-legal journals.31 But neither (in contrast to Hunter’s view 
stated above) does empirical legal research necessarily constitute socio-legal research. Darbyshire’s 
book Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges is instructive in this respect.32 In it she relies 
upon interview and observational data in order to offer a detailed snapshot of the work of some 
judges in specific courts, the result being “a rich and revealing ethnographical study that achieves 
that rare feat of enabling lawyers and non-lawyers alike to better understand what judges in various 
courts actually do”.33 Darbyshire’s work is empirical legal research: by examining the everyday 
routine of some judges through first-hand accounts it offers more than a black letter account of 
judicial decision-making, and thereby offers an insight into the practical operation of law in some 
courts. The book does not, however, attempt to place this anthropological material within the context 
of broader sociological theory, nor does it adopt a critical and reflexive voice, and as such, it is left 
exposed to criticism.34 
To reiterate, the interaction between law and other social phenomena or between law and the (other) 
social sciences is not a defining element of empirical legal research, although it is likely to be a feature 
of it. This distinguishes empirical legal research from the socio-legal approach. Empirical legal research 
involves the systematic collection of data in order to contribute to knowledge about law 
Arts and Humanities and the Social Sciences, p 3, http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ images/Joint AHRC ESRC Statement on Subject  
Coverage tcm8-2637.pdf viewed 9 December 2013. For an alternative definition, see Hunter, n 10, p 3. 
25 See http://www.slsa.ac.uk viewed 9 December 2013. See also Harris DR, “The Development of Socio-Legal Studies in the 
United Kingdom” (1983) 3.3 Legal Studies 315 at 315. 
26 The use of primary data in order to generate knowledge about law in practice. 
27 Hunter, for example, uses the terms “socio legal research” and “empirical legal research” interchangeably, see n 10, pp 8-9. 
28 Hunter, n 10, p 3. 
29 Genn, Partington and Wheeler, n 1 at [183]. 
30 A claim supported by others, see eg Cownie and Bradney, n 23, p 45. 
31 See, eg the Journal of Law and Society and Law and Society Review. 
32 Darbyshire P, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011). 
33 Gee G, “Book Review” (2012) 32.4 Legal Studies 680 at 680. 
34 In respect of specific criticism targeted at Darbyshire’s methodology, Hunter makes two “socio-legal observations”, which are: 
that too much data was collected; and that the author failed to address the issue of institutional capture. See Hunter R, “Review 
Essay” (2012) Feminist Legal Studies, published online at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10691-012-9228-3. More 
generally, some scholars argue that empirical research is of value only if it engages fully in theoretical exposition. Hillyard, for 
example, refers to a “preoccupation with theory in socio-legal studies and the consequent neglect of researching the material 
realities of modern life”. See Hillyard P, “Invoking Indignation: Reflections on Future Directions of Socio-Legal Studies” (2002) 29 
Journal of Law and Society 645 at 646. For more on this debate see Banakar R and Travers M, “Introduction” in Banakar R and 
Travers M (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005) pp ix-xvi and McDermont M, 
Morgan B and Cowan D, “Socio-Legal Studies Module: The Bristol Experience” in Hunter, n 10, pp 19-36. 
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by offering an account of how it operates in the “real world”, even where that “real world” is limited to 
the legal profession and how members of it interact with each other. 
An example 
The distinction between the various approaches to research within property law is best illustrated by 
reference to an example. The authors will focus here on the process of mortgage possession in 
England and Wales (cf, foreclosure in United States terminology). By virtue of the Administration of 
Justice Act 1970 (UK), s 36, the court has discretion to adjourn or postpone the grant of an order for 
possession of a house if it appears to the court that the mortgagor is likely, within a reasonable period, 
to be able to pay any sums due. The ability of the mortgagor to do this will be dependent to a large 
extent on the length of suspension granted by the district judge. A mortgagor who owes, say, £2,000 
will obviously find it easier to clear those arrears over five years rather than two, a fact recognised by 
the Court of Appeal in Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society v Norgan [1996] 1 All ER 449. 
The Court of Appeal held that when assessing a “reasonable period”, it was appropriate for the court 
to take account of the remaining term of the mortgage (the “Norgan calculation”) and, accordingly, 
the existing practice of imposing a shorter fixed period of two or more years should then no longer be 
followed. 
In view of the comments from the Court of Appeal in Norgan, a doctrinal lawyer would likely 
assume that district judges, when deciding whether to suspend an order for possession, will begin by 
asking whether the mortgagor can repay the arrears over the remaining term of the mortgage. Given 
that the typical length of most first acquisition mortgages is 25 years, and that the majority of cases 
that come before the courts are in the early stages of the mortgage,35 it may be assumed that most 
mortgagors (capable of meeting their normal monthly payments) will be able to show an ability to 
clear their arrears over this period. As Thompson notes, “it will clearly be easier to meet the additional 
payments necessary to clear the arrears and meet the ongoing payment if such payments are spread out 
over the whole period of the loan rather than having to be made within a set, and somewhat arbitrary, 
period”.36 To this extent, therefore, a black letter approach would suggest that all lower courts 
implement the Norgan calculation, thereby affording the mortgagor protection against unnecessary and 
immediate possession. 
A socio-legal lawyer may tell us that this protection is justified given the importance which 
attaches to “home”,37 or as a result of the pressure that many households feel to aspire to home 
ownership as a result of the housing policies of successive governments,38 or the implications of losing 
one’s home.39 Fox, for example, draws upon a range of multidisciplinary sources, both empirical and 
theoretical, in order to evaluate the importance of “home” in the property law context. In relation to the 
Administration of Justice Act, s 36 in particular, Fox argues that, while it serves as an example of “a 
legal context in which ... ‘home considerations’ are taken into account”, its focus on 
35 Research suggests that repossession is more likely in the first few years of the mortgage due to the lack of equity in the 
home and payments tending to be at the margins of affordability, see AdviceUK, Citizens Advice and Shelter, “Turning the 
Tide? Evidence from the Free Advice Sector on Mortgage and Secured Loan Possession Actions in England in July 2009” (15 
December 2009) p 9, http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/policy/policy publications/turning the tide .htm viewed 9 
December 2013. 
36 See Thompson MP, Modern Land Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) p 519. 
37 See, eg Bright SJ, “Dispossession for Arrears: The Weight of Home in English Law” in Fox O’Mahony L and Sweeney JA 
(eds), The Idea of Home in Law: Displacement and Dispossession (Ashgate, London, 2010); Fox L, Conceptualising Home: 
Theories, Law and Policies (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007); and Radin MJ, “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stanford Law 
Review 957. 
38 See, eg Cowan D, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) p 260; Kemeny J, The Myth of 
Home-Ownership (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981); Stewart A, “Rethinking Housing Law: A Contribution to the Debate 
on Tenure” (1994) 9.2 Housing Studies 263; and Whitehouse L, “The Impact of Consumerism on the Home-Owner” in Cowan D 
(ed), Housing: Participation and Exclusion (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1998) p 126. 
39 See, eg the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, The Social Consequences of Mortgage Repossession for Parents and Their Children 
(York, 1999) and Nettleton S and Burrows R, “When a Capital Investment Becomes an Emotional Loss: The Health 
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the mortgagor’s ability to pay tends to prioritise the financial interests of the mortgagee rather than the 
“non-financial claims of occupiers to the use of the property as a home”.40 
An empirical legal researcher, however, may tell quite a different story. Whitehouse’s work, for 
example, which included interviews with a sample of district judges, revealed that, in practice, the 
tendency of most district judges is to suspend orders for no more than five years.41 The reason that these 
judges felt unable to use the Norgan calculation was due to the costs imposed on mortgagors while they 
remained in arrears.42 As one of the judges interviewed noted: “You can’t forget that although you are 
making orders in respect of what has got to be paid off the arrears, you have got to think of what the 
incidence of interest is going to be”.43 
As this example illustrates, it is possible to view the same legal issue through very different lenses 
depending upon the approach adopted by the researcher. More significantly, it also indicates that the 
traditional doctrinal approach has the potential to offer a misrepresentative and misleading account of 
law. The value and significance of empirical legal research, therefore, is its ability to demonstrate that 
what is written in the books is not always what happens in practice. 
THE METHODS OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 
It is not possible, within the confines of this short piece, to offer a detailed insight into the various 
methodological approaches and tools available to the researcher. The aim rather is to direct the reader 
to sources of advice and guidance taken from the vast amount of literature available in respect of 
research methodology. The authors also seek to highlight some of the issues that every researcher must 
consider when planning and designing their empirical research. The methods employed in empirical 
legal research are numerous and the literature relevant to them substantial,44 but there is a degree of 
commonality in the process by which researchers arrive at the decision to conduct empirical legal 
research. It begins with a question about law that cannot be answered unequivocally by reference to 
primary legal data or existing secondary social science material, or at least a suspicion that existing 
data does not tell the whole story. Again, the example about mortgage possession illustrates this. The 
statutory provisions and case law tell us that the district judges have discretion to set a “reasonable 
period” but the Norgan calculation suggests that this discretion would usually be exercised by 
extending it over the remaining term of the mortgage. The researcher who wants to know what 
happens can only find this out by doing empirical work. In property law there are many other examples 
that could be drawn upon to illustrate this point. 
Having identified a research question, it is then necessary to think about which methods can be used 
to answer it. Epstein and Martin summarise the researcher’s tasks as being to “design their projects, 
collect and code data, conduct analyses, and present results”.45 This apparently simple process, however, 
belies a controversial debate within empirical legal research which concerns 
40 Fox, n 37, p 277. 
41 See, eg Whitehouse L, “The Home Owner: Citizen or Consumer?” in Bright S and Dewar J (eds), Land Law: Themes and 
Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998) p 19 and Whitehouse L, “Mapping the Boundaries of the Law of Mortgage: 
The Repossession Process in Practice” in Twigg-Flesner C and Villalta-Puig G (eds), The Boundaries of Commercial and Trade 
Law (Sellier, Munich, 2011) p 68. 
42 See, eg Whitehouse L, “Making The Case for Socio-Legal Research in Land Law: Renner and the Law of Mortgage” (2010) 
37.4 Journal of Law and Society 545 at 565. 
43 Whitehouse, n 38, p 140. 
44 Examples include, Creswell JW, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Sage, Los 
Angeles, 2014); Devine F and Heath S (eds), Doing Social Science: Evidence and Methods in Empirical Research (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009); McConville M and Hong Chui W (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2007); Trainor AA and Graue E (eds), Reviewing Qualitative Research in the Social Sciences (Routledge, London, 
2013); and Van Hoecke M (ed), Methodologies of Legal Research: What Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline? (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2011). 
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whether empirical legal research is only of value if it is underpinned by a theoretical framework.46 As 
the authors have argued elsewhere and above,47 empirical legal research is of value for the reason that it 
can shine light on areas of the law in relation to which precious little knowledge exists. It is possible, 
therefore, for empirical legal research to add to knowledge regardless of whether the researcher is 
engaging fully in theoretical analysis, as demonstrated by the example provided above in respect of how 
judges define the “reasonable period” in the Administration of Justice Act, s 36. 
Regardless of whether the research begins by positing a hypothesis, seeks to draw one out during 
the collection of data, or omits theory entirely, empirical legal research must employ robust research 
methodology. As Epstein and King make clear, “regardless of the purpose, effect, or intended 
audience of the research, academics have an obligation to produce work that is reliable”.48 For 
empirical legal researchers, primary data forms the clay with which they work in order to create a 
coherent structure. The methods used will depend both on the research question and also on whether 
the data already exists but needs to be collected (perhaps by examining court files), or whether new 
data has to be generated (perhaps by conducting surveys or interviews). Further, methods are likely to 
evolve as the research progresses with the discovery of new ideas or the presentation of unexpected 
obstacles or hurdles with the original research design. When quantitative data49 is used, empirical 
legal research becomes closely associated with scientific research.50 Even though many legal, and 
other social science, researchers “do not have the luxury of analyzing data they developed in an 
experiment” and have to rely instead on data generated in the real world,51 this does not mean that the 
methodology should not be robust. Indeed, much of the modern American literature on empirical 
legal research, in relation to both quantitative and qualitative data, adopts the language and methods 
normally associated with scientific enquiry and rejects as flawed any research that does not adopt 
rigorous scientific methodology.52 
Alternative to the wide measuring approach of quantitative work, the researcher may wish to dig 
deep or to discover more of the “experience” of a particular legal phenomenon. This is likely to 
involve the use of qualitative research methods such as interviews and observations.53 Webley 
explains the value of in-depth qualitative studies, noting that they “are designed to go beyond 
description to find meaning ... In-depth research affords the researcher the opportunity to learn how 
research participants understand the world and interact with each other”.54 As with quantitative 
studies, such in-depth projects must be well designed and executed. 
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative studies seems clear but they are not mutually 
exclusive and there is a growing trend in empirical legal research for the researcher to use “mixed 
methods” research.55 The use of “more than one research technique or strategy to study one or several 
46 Campbell and Wiles were scathing in their assessment of early empirical legal research, warning that its impact would remain 
piecemeal and ad hoc unless it was part of an “attempt to develop a more general theory of social order and law”, Campbell and 
Wiles, n 18 at 572. 
47 See Bright S and Whitehouse L, “The Opportunities and Challenges of Empirical Work: Housing Possession in Theory 
and Practice” in Akkermans B, Marais E and Ramaekers E (eds), Property Law Perspective II (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2013) 
pp 63-82. 
48 Epstein L and King G, “The Rules of Inference” (2002) 69.1 Chicago Law Review 1 at 9. 
49 For a definition see Webley L, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research” in Cane and Kritzer (eds), n 1, pp 
926-950. 
50 Epstein and King, n 48 at 24. 
51 Epstein and Martin, n 45, p 904. 
52 See, eg Huang K, “How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An Empirical Perspective from Taiwan” (2008) 5.2 
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 197 and Fagan J, Davies G and Carlis A, “Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing” 
(2012) 9.4 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 697. 
53 See n 44 for more information on qualitative research methods. 
54 Webley, n 49, p 934. 
55 Nielsen LB, “The Need for Multi-Method Approaches in Empirical Legal Research” in Cane and Kritzer (eds), n 1, 
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closely related phenomena”56 is beneficial for the reason that it provides “more reliable” information 
than one technique alone does.57 As Nielsen points out, however, “methodological eclecticism”58 can 
create its own issues, including higher costs (both time and financial), the amount of data produced (too 
much) and what to do with it.59 Indeed, the “messiness” of data is a well-recognised challenge within 
empirical legal research.60 
It is clear that research design and the manner in which data is obtained will determine the extent 
to which the research and its findings will be considered valid and dependable.61 The authors would 
argue, however, that research within the social sciences and particularly within law, should not be 
rejected solely for the reason that it is “atheoretical” or does not apply the language or methodology of 
scientific enquiry. Provided the researcher acknowledges any weaknesses in the methodology and the 
implications this may have for any claims made within the work, then such “unscientific” empirical 
research can still offer interesting and valuable insights into how law operates in practice. What must 
be emphasised, however, is that the methodology must be robust to ensure the veracity of the data 
obtained. It is these aspects that pose unique and not inconsiderable challenges to the empirical legal 
researcher. 
THE KEY CHALLENGES FACING THE EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCHER 
Returning to the issue raised at the beginning of this article, empirical legal research has never enjoyed 
the popularity associated with other approaches to research in property law and, it seems, is a dwindling 
art. When one considers the challenges facing the empirical legal researcher, this “(relative) dearth of 
empirical legal scholarship”62 becomes explicable. The nature of these challenges are expressed by 
Friedman in the following quote: 
To begin with, empirical research is hard work, and lots of it; it is also non-library research, and many law 
teachers are afraid of it; it calls for skills that most law teachers do not have; if it is at all elaborate, it is 
team research, and law teachers are not used to this kind of effort; often it requires hustling grant money 
from foundations or government agencies, and law teachers simply do not know how to do that. The 
whole thrust of legal education goes against the grain of law and society. Law school tries to empty the 
mind of all “extraneous” matter, the better to develop legal skills. The finest products of this process, of 
course, end up as teachers. Once they have emptied themselves of the extraneous, it is hard to reverse the 
process; and mostly they never try.63 
As Heise explains, Friedman’s point is not to suggest that non-empirical research is easy but that 
“empirical research projects typically force legal scholars to confront a unique set of obstacles, many of 
which stem from law schools’ general and traditional orientation away from empirical research”.64 The 
following sections explore some of these challenges in more detail. 
Lack of training 
Many legal scholars have received no, or relatively little, training in research methodology, unlike 
students in other social sciences.65 Legal academics embarking on empirical legal research for the first 
time either have to learn these techniques or work with others who are trained or experienced in them. 
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The empirical approach to research in property law 
This lack of formal training can give rise to what Schmidt and Halliday coin as Methodological 
Anxiety Syndrome (MAS) which is “a pervasive and sometimes debilitating doubt about whether one 
has the necessary methodological skills to embark on empirical socio-legal work in the first place”.66 
The extent to which legal academics are justified in exhibiting symptoms of MAS can be 
demonstrated by reference to an example taken from the United States. Hull, then Associate Professor 
at Rutger’s University, published a less than flattering review67 of Mann’s research into 5,317 civil 
cases involving debt in Connecticut.68 Hull begins by noting that empirical research is “the most 
pressing item on the agenda of legal scholarship”69 and hence Mann’s research should be welcomed; 
however, she goes on to pick holes in Mann’s methodology to such an extent that she concludes that 
Mann’s quantitative arguments are flawed.70 This only goes to reinforce the point made earlier about 
the importance of following a robust methodology. The problem is that recognition of this need feeds 
MAS! 
While it is easy for legal scholars to be intimidated by a lack of formal training, Schmidt and 
Halliday do not think that formal training, although advisable, is a prerequisite of sound 
methodological technique.71 They concede that even “naive fieldwork”72 has value, not in and of 
itself as such, but as a starting point from which the researcher can move forward, improving their 
skills and developing more sophisticated methods. They encourage researchers to offer a “warts and 
all”73 account of their projects, to admit the mistakes made and to give due credit to the often 
serendipitous nature of empirical research so that it might “relieve many of the worries that plague 
students and scholars”.74 Some suggest that a lack of training can be compensated for by working 
collaboratively with colleagues who do have the necessary expertise.75 This will require lawyers to 
break away from the “lone scholar” model of scholarship which is dominant in law schools,76 and 
embrace collaborative and multidisciplinary research. Universities are also nowadays generally better 
at providing support and training for those seeking to adopt new methods, particularly with the 
development of online tools. 
Funding 
Empirical legal research is expensive, both in terms of time and financial costs. It is, therefore, the type 
of research that requires funding.77 In an era in which universities are encouraging academic staff to 
obtain competitive research funding, legal academics have often struggled to see the value of this: 
traditional black letter research, with its focus on library/computer based sources, appears to require 
little in the way of additional funding. Empirical legal research, however, usually involves direct costs 
such as travel expenses or the employment of research assistants. It does, therefore, offer a route for 
making funding applications, which will be attractive to employers. The lack of formal training in 
research methodology, however, raises its head again as a potential hurdle. As Wheeler and Thomas 
write, potential research funders “have voiced their consternation at the level of engagement or indeed 
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Whitehouse and Bright 
lack of it with methodology that is sometimes revealed in socio-legal funding applications”.78 Empirical 
legal researchers seeking funding must, therefore, be careful to engage with the language and practices 
of social science research methodology in their applications. This will, of course, also ensure that their 
project is well designed and executed. 
Accessing data and respondents 
Given that primary data forms the core element of any empirical legal research project, gaining access 
to that data is a fundamental prerequisite of a successful project. The planning stages of empirical legal 
research are time-consuming and can be frustrating. The researcher must give careful consideration as 
to how access to potential respondents will be secured, and may need to enlist the help of others in 
opening doors. It may, for example, be necessary to gain permission before approaching potential 
respondents and this can take months, if not years, to obtain (and may not always be forthcoming). As 
Burton notes, “organisations, such as the police and courts, are often deluged with research requests 
and those in authority may be reluctant to grant permission for their staff to devote time to what they 
see as unproductive academic research activities”.79 
Ethics 
Consideration of the ethical implications of the research is fundamental. There will often be both 
institutional and external processes to be followed in gaining ethics approval. Assistance in this respect 
is available through a review of the literature on research methodology and best practice guidelines such 
as those offered by the ESRC and SLSA.80 The key consideration in any research which involves human 
participants is the avoidance of harm, but other ethical principles are also important such as ensuring 
that respondents participate on an informed and consensual basis, that information supplied is 
confidential and that the anonymity of respondents is protected. To ensure that this is achieved, careful 
planning is crucial and ethical issues much be considered at the earliest stage. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although empirical legal research is not easy and is sometimes frustrating, it is intellectually rewarding 
and enjoyable to do.81 It is incumbent upon established empirical legal scholars, particularly in the 
field of property law, to mentor less experienced researchers but these efforts must be supported and 
facilitated by an infrastructure of training, funding and collaboration.82 There are unique benefits to be 
derived from exploring the practical realities of law, “boundless opportunities ... to explore uncharted 
territory”, the chance to establish “an original voice” and “the prospect of conducting path-breaking 
work that is relevant, influential and socially important”.83 
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